- R. Canetti, R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. Adaptive Security for Threshold Cryptosystems. Mansuscript, 1999.Google Scholar
- R. Cramer, R. Gennaro, and B. Schoenmakers. A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’ 97, pages 103–118. LNCS No. 1233.Google Scholar
- M. Cerecedo, T. Matsumoto, and H. Imai. Efficient and secure multiparty generation of digital signatures based on discrete logarithms. IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, E76-A(4):532–545, 1993.Google Scholar
- Yvo Desmedt and Yair Frankel. Threshold cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology — Crypto’ 89, pages 307–315. LNCS No. 435.Google Scholar
- T. ElGamal. A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, IT 31:469–472, 1985.CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
- P. Feldman. A Practical Scheme for Non-Interactive Verifiable Secret Sharing. In Proc. 28th FOCS, pages 427–437.Google Scholar
- Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, P. Mackenzie, and M. Yung. Optimal resilience proactive public-key cryptosystems. In Proc. 38th FOCS, pages 384–393. IEEE, 1997.Google Scholar
- R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. Robust threshold DSS signatures. In Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’ 96, pages 354–371. LNCS No. 1070.Google Scholar
- R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. Secure Distributed Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems http://www.research.ibm.com/security/dkg.ps
- L. Harn. Group oriented (t; n) digital signature scheme. IEE Proc.-Comput.Digit.Tech, 141(5):307–313, Sept 1994.zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- A. Herzberg, M. Jakobsson, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung. Proactive public key and signature systems. In 1997 ACM Conference on Computers and Communication Security, 1997.Google Scholar
- A. Herzberg, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung. Proactive secret sharing, or: How to cope with perpetual leakage. In Advances in Cryptology — Crypto’ 95, pages 339–352. LNCS No. 963.Google Scholar
- C.-H. Li, T. Hwang, and N.-Y. Lee. (t; n) threshold signature schemes ased on discrete logarithm. In Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’ 94, pages 191–200. LNCS No. 950.Google Scholar
- T. Pedersen. A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party. In Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’ 91, pages 522–526. LNCS No. 547.Google Scholar
- T. Pedersen. Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In Advances in Cryptology — Crypto’ 91, pages 129–140. LNCS No. 576.Google Scholar
- C. Park and K. Kurosawa. New ElGamal Type Threshold Digital Signature Scheme. IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, E79-A(1):86–93, January 1996.Google Scholar
- C. P. Schnorr. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. Journal of Cryptology, 4:161–174, 1991.zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- V. Shoup and R. Gennaro. Securing threshold cryptosystems against chosen ciphertext attack. In Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’ 98, pages 1–16. LNCS No. 1403.Google Scholar
- A. Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM, 22:612–613, 1979.zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
![Secure Distributed Key Generation For Discrete-log Based Cryptosystems Secure Distributed Key Generation For Discrete-log Based Cryptosystems](/uploads/1/2/6/1/126141007/806725190.png)
Secure Distributed Key Generation For Discrete-log Based Cryptosystems And Signature
Specifically, adaptively secure solutions for distributed key generation in discrete-log based cryptosystems are provided, and for the problem of distributed generation of DSS signatures (threshold DSS). It is also shown how to transform existent static solutions for threshold and proactive RSA to withstand the stronger adaptive attackers. This paper investigates the fundamental difference between a simple e-tender box and a traditional physical tender box, and highlights a series of security traps created by the functional differences. Based on our findings, we have defined the security requirements for an e-tender submission protocol. We also discuss functional limitations of cryptographic technologies. As a result, two secure. In this sense distributed key generation is a logical preliminary step for doing threshold decryption without need for a trusted third party. There are different algorithms for different key types. Gennaro et al. Introduced a secure protocol for discrete log-based systems in 1999 (online available at citeseer). ? OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-Out, Decentralized Ledger via Sharding. ? Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems. Gennaro R, Jarecki S, Krawczyk H, et al. Distributed Cryptography Based on the Proofs of Work. Andrychowicz M, and Dziembowski S. A Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol is an essential component of any threshold cryptosystem. It is used to initialize the cryptosystem and generate its private and public keys, and it is used as a subprotocol, for example to generate a onetime key pair which is a part of any threshold ElGamallike signature scheme.